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The eurozone is caught in a ‘diabolical loop’ in which weak domestic banking systems 
damage sovereign fiscal positions and conversely, in which risky sovereign positions 
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a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund.  
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Introduction 
Cross-border banking is not stable in the current institutional setting. As national authorities 
focus on preserving the national parts of a cross-border bank, the integrated value of a bank 
is neglected in times of crisis. As Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, has put it 
lucidly, “banks are international in life but national in death”. 
The internal market in the EU is built on the free movement of people, goods, services and 
capital. Cross-border firms supply goods and services throughout Europe. Cross-border 
banks facilitate the cross-border traffic by persons and firms. European banks are thus an 
integral part of the internal market. 
European banks need a European safety net (Veron, 2011; Marzinotto et al., 2011; 
Schoenmaker, 2012; and ECB, 2012). The organisation of the safety net is a precondition for 
putting the supervisory framework on a European footing. The endgame of resolution is 
driving incentives for supervision (Claessens et al., 2010). 
A European-level banking system can do much to stabilise the eurozone by breaking the 
‘diabolical loop’ by which a weak domestic banking system damages the sovereign fiscal 
position and, in the other direction, a risky sovereign position disproportionately threatens 
domestic banking stability (Lane, 2012). 
However, the European sharing of banking-sector risk is only feasible if (national) fiscal 
weaknesses do not threaten banking stability. This requires action on two fronts: to induce 
banks to diversify their sovereign risk (e.g. applying large exposure limits to sovereign debt) 
and to redouble efforts to ensure that national fiscal positions are sufficiently robust that they 
do not tempt national governments to indirectly seek funding or resources from their local 
banks (Fiscal Compact). 
In this CEPS Working Document, we sketch the building blocks for a European safety net for 
European banks. We first outline the principles for setting up a safety net. Next, we provide 
a rough draft of a prospective European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund (EDIRF). 
The paper aims to promote debate among policy-makers, industry and academia on such a 
Fund. 
Principles for a safety net 
To design a safety net, it is important to have a common understanding of the underlying 
principles. The focus of this Policy Brief is on the resolution stage. See Schoenmaker (2012) 
for a discussion of the role of supervision (including prompt corrective action) and the role of 
lender of last resort of central banks. The three basic resolution methods for failing banks are 
liquidation with a deposit pay-off, a take-over with public support, and direct public 
support. There are seven golden principles for an appropriate safety net:  2 |  SCHOENMAKER & GROS 
 
1.  Private sector solutions are preferable. When banks get in difficulties, private sector 
solutions should be tried first. These private sector solutions include recapitalisation by 
existing shareholders and bondholders (bail-in) and a take-over by another bank 
without public support. 
2.  Sufficient geographical reach. To foster the stability of banks, the safety net should 
have the same geographical reach as the main activities of a bank. So European banks 
need a European safety net. 
3.  Least cost principle. The least cost procedures require the resolution authority to 
choose the resolution method in which the total amount of the expenditures and 
(contingent) liabilities incurred has the lowest cost to the deposit insurance and 
resolution fund. The only exception is if there are systemic risks affecting the financial 
system. 
4.  Private funds for resolution. The deposit insurance and resolution fund should be 
funded with ex ante levies on the insured banks. In that way, private funds are 
available for resolution. 
5.  Fiscal backstop. Crises affecting banks are commonly macroeconomic and general in 
nature, following asset market collapses and economic downturns. The deposit 
insurance and resolution fund can thus run out of funds. The ultimate backup of 
government support is needed to give the fund credibility. 
6.  Swift decision-making. Swift decision-making is a crucial ingredient of crisis 
management. A myriad of national funds is difficult to activate during a crisis and may 
give rise to conflicts. Similarly, two separate funds for deposit insurance and resolution 
may lead to interagency conflicts. A single fund with the necessary powers can act 
swiftly. More generally, there is a need to keep crisis arrangements simple. 
7.  Good governance. An appropriate system of governance should ensure that the 
deposit insurance and resolution authority is acting within its mandate. Moreover, the 
authority should be held accountable to the parliament and the executive. 
A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund 
Deposit insurance and resolution are in principle separate functions. In the US they have 
been combined. The Dodd-Frank Act assigns resolution powers for large banks to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in addition to the existing FDIC powers for 
smaller banks. By analogy, Allen et al.  (2011) and Gerhardt & Lannoo (2011) suggest 
combining the two functions within some kind of European equivalent of the FDIC. The EU 
would then also get a deposit insurance fund with resolution powers.1 The combination 
allows for swift decision-making. Moreover, the least cost principle (choosing between 
liquidation with deposit pay-offs or public support) can then internally be applied in each 
case. That would also contribute to swift crisis management.  
A prospective European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund should be part of a wider 
European banking regime, as illustrated by Figure 1. In this new regime, the European 
Banking Authority would have direct supervisory powers over the large banks in Europe. 
                                                      
1 The current bank resolution debate in the EU is uneven. The European Commission continues to 
work on the home country approach. This will lead to legal problems, and leave EU banks lagging in 
competitiveness behind US banks. By contrast, the ECB (2012) stresses the need for a euro area 
Resolution Authority, to be broadened to an integral EU resolution framework on a full EU-wide basis 
in the longer term. A EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND RESOLUTION FUND | 3 
 
The European Central Bank provides lender of last resort support to these banks, if needed.2 
On the geographical reach, it is an open question whether the new banking regime starts 
with the euro area banks or straightaway with all large EU banks. The political dynamics 
suggest that the feasibility of euro area arrangements is currently higher. At a later stage, 
arrangements can be extended in order to preserve the internal market in banking, which has 
an EU-wide coverage.  




Source: Schoenmaker (2012). 
The EDIRF would be fed through regular risk-based deposit insurance premiums from the 
banks whose customers benefit from its protection, i.e. the largest banks in Europe, the so-
called ‘EBA banks’ (see below for the number of EBA banks).  
Any new deposit insurance scheme has to face the problem of the transition to the new 
steady state. This has two aspects – a general and a specific one: 
•  General: There is the ‘traditional’ transitional issue for deposit insurance. How to get 
the fund ready at the same time as the guarantee kicks in. Since the European Deposit 
Insurance scheme proposed here would substitute for existing national schemes, it 
could in principle obtain its initial funding from the existing national funds, which will 
have a much lower financing need given that the EBA banks account for a large share 
of deposits. A simple transfer of funds from national deposit insurance funds to a new 
European Deposit Insurance Fund will be troublesome, because not all countries have 
pre-funded schemes. But this problem may be not that severe in practice, since most 
pre-funded schemes are currently more or less exhausted as a result of pay-outs during 
the on-going financial crisis.3 Moreover, a consensus is emerging for pre-funded 
deposit insurance with risk-based premiums. 
•  Specific: Ideally the creation of a safety net should take place under a ‘veil of 
ignorance’, i.e. everybody should be interested in participating since a priori it is not 
known where the losses will arise. Unfortunately, this is not the case in Europe at 
present. Given the financial and macroeconomic stress in the Southern part of the euro 
area, it is clear that this is where most of the losses are to be expected. A precondition 
for establishing any European Deposit Insurance scheme is thus that the banking 
system in the countries under financial distress is first put on a sound footing by a 
combination of balance sheet cleansing and recapitalisation.  
The establishment of a viable fund is important. A suggestion is to start off with a European 
Deposit Insurance Fund funded by deposit insurance premiums. Once the Fund reaches a 
certain size, it can also be used for resolution, turning it into a fully fledged EDIRF. In that 
way, private sector funds are available for resolution in crisis management. To ensure that 
                                                      
2 Officially, the ECB only provides liquidity to euro area banks. But most major banks outside the 
eurozone have an affiliate (branch or subsidiary) in the euro area and have thus access to the ECB. 
3 Some national deposit insurance funds even have a liability. That liability should be resolved at the 
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sufficient private funds are built up, the cap on the size of the fund should not be too small 
(as is currently the case with some deposit insurance funds). 
National deposit insurance funds have an implicit or explicit fiscal backstop of the national 
government. With the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) up and running, a fiscal 
backstop can be easily implemented for a euro area-based EDIRF.4 All one would need for an 
EU-wide system would be a burden-sharing mechanism between the ESM and the other 
member countries (Goodhart & Schoenmaker, 2009). In the case of the rescue package for 
Ireland in 2010, the non-eurozone countries (UK, Denmark and Sweden) joined in the 
burden-sharing following the ECB capital key, as UK banks were exposed to Ireland and 
would thus also benefit from enhanced financial stability in Ireland. That shows that burden-
sharing can be widened if and when needed. 
A prospective European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) could be 
established by a EU Regulation, akin to the establishment of the European Banking 
Authority. The chair would accordingly be accountable to the European Parliament. 
Moreover, the chair would need a working relationship with the European Council and the 
European Commission for general banking policies, including the arrangements for the fiscal 
backstop. But the European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority would be fully 
independent in individual cases. 
A further question is where to place the new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution 
Authority in the institutional architecture? Beck et al. (2012) suggest that a stand-alone 
deposit insurer will be tougher on interventions to protect depositors. Supervisors may be 
more lenient in case of regulatory capture by banks. Using an incomplete contracts approach, 
Repullo (2000) concludes that deposit insurance should be separate from lender of last resort, 
while lender of last resort and supervision may be combined. Following this analysis, we 
suggest that the European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority should be 
independent from the European Central Bank and the European Banking Authority. 
Reach of European deposit insurance 
What should be the reach of a European Deposit Insurance (and Resolution) Fund: only the 
large banks or all EU banks? The guiding principle is that end-responsibility for deposit 
insurance (including fiscal backstop) and supervision are organised at the same level. This 
would ensure that supervision is incentive-compatible. Broadly speaking, there are two 
systems for supervision and deposit insurance. 
The first system is the largest European banks supervised by EBA and insured by EDIRA. 
All other EU banks are then supervised by the national supervisors and insured by the 
national deposit insurance fund. Figure 2 illustrates the dual approach. The advantage is that 
there is a clear line of authority at European and at national level. It is also in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity: large banks give rise to cross-border externalities and need 
therefore to be supervised at the European level, while smaller banks are more domestically-
oriented. The disadvantage is that depositors in national banks in countries with a weak 
fiscal backstop may migrate to EBA banks. 
                                                      
4 Article 15 of the ESM Treaty explicitly allows for financial assistance for the re-capitalisation of 
financial institutions of an ESM member. A EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND RESOLUTION FUND | 5 
 
Figure 2. Dual approach for supervising European banks 
 
The second system would place all EU banks under the authority of EBA. EBA directly 
supervises the large European banks and delegates supervision of all other EU banks to the 
national supervisors (but keeps final responsibility). Figure 3 illustrates the integrated 
approach. All EU banks would then be insured by EDIRA. This is the case in the US, where 
the FDIC insures all banks, both nationally and state-chartered banks. Before the 
establishment of the US-wide FDIC in the 1930s, it appeared that state-level deposit 
insurance funds were not stable due to undiversified, mainly agricultural, risks in the 1920s 
(FDIC, 1998). But there is one major difference with the US. In Europe the most important 
taxing powers are at national level, whereas in the US, they reside at the federal level.  
The advantage is that a pan-European Deposit Insurance Fund would establish equally 
strong deposit insurance across the EU. But the delegation of supervisory powers of the 
smaller banks to national supervisors would still allow for the possibility of national 
champions cherished by national supervisors, while costs are off-loaded to European deposit 
insurance. The challenge is to get the EBA and national supervisors to adopt a European 
ethos. 
Figure 3. Integrated approach for supervising European banks 
 
A mix of both regimes may be preferable. Putting banking supervision and deposit insurance 
at the European level is politically sensitive. Large EBA banks, however, need to be 
supervised at the European level because of cross-border externalities (subsidiarity 
principle). The choice can be left to member states to join with the remainder of their banking 
system in the new European banking regime, or not.  
McCahery et al. (2010) develop an interesting approach from a political economy 
perspective. They propose a choice-based approach, under which countries can opt-in to 
transfer supervisory powers to the European level. It is important that the country transfers 
all national banks at the same time. If the choice is left to the banks, the stronger national 
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banks may opt for the European supervisory and deposit insurance regime. This would 
leave the national deposit insurance fund with the weaker banks. US history indicates that 
the viability of such state-level deposit insurance funds is very limited. 
To ensure the integrity of EBA supervision and the strength of the European Deposit 
Insurance and Resolution Fund (EDIRF), the EBA should be able to refuse weak banks from 
countries that choose to opt-in. The EBA should conduct a tough, market-based test 
(checking both book and market values of equity as well as liquid assets) before granting 
banks access to the European Fund. Weaker banks may thus be required to wind down their 
operations, or to raise extra capital and/or liquidity before entering the Fund. This way 
would prevent potential problems with weak banks from being off-loaded to the European 
Fund, for that would not be acceptable to other members.  
The EDIRF should operate as a source of strength for the European banking system. In the 
ongoing supervision, EBA should also adopt prompt corrective action to minimise deposit 
insurance losses by mandating supervisory action as capital declines (Nieto & Wall, 2006). As 
swift action may be needed, in particular before the bank becomes balance-sheet insolvent, a 
special resolution mechanism (akin to the recently adopted Special Resolution Regime in the 
UK) is necessary for the EDIRF. 
This mixed approach would follow the US model where banks can choose between a 
national (i.e. federal) license from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or a 
state license from the relevant state banking supervisor. Nevertheless, there is one important 
difference. In the choice-based approach of McCahery et al. (2010), the choice is for the 
countries to make and not the banks. 
Summing up, the mixed approach requires that i) large cross-border EBA banks are obliged 
to be supervised by the new European banking regime and ii) member states can choose to 
opt-in their national banks into the new European banking regime. In the European banking 
regime, the EBA chair should overcome the national interests in supervision and crisis 
resolution by adopting a European perspective. 
Some numbers 
The proposal would be to require all banks above a certain size to apply for authorisation at 
the EBA. In 2009, there were nearly 8,400 banks in the EU. These banks can be segmented 
into three groups (De Haan et al., 2012): 
•  The first, very large, group of banks consists of small banks operating in a region of a 
country. In particular, Germany and Austria have many small savings and cooperative 
banks, most of which have assets of less than €2 billion. 
•  The second group consists of medium-sized banks with assets ranging from €2 to €100 
billion. These banks often operate on a countrywide scale. 
•  The third group comprises the large banks having assets up to €2,000 billion. There are 
currently about 50 banks across the EU with assets over €100 billion (see Table A.1). 
It appears that the upper part of the group of large group conduct (a significant) part of their 
business abroad. These are the banks with assets over €200 billion. The lower part with assets 
between €100 and €200 billion are more domestically-oriented. Following the subsidiarity 
principle, the banks with assets of €200 billion or more would be subject to EBA supervision. 
There are currently 35 banks across the EU with assets over €200 billion. 
Next, we calculate the size of the EDIRF for two scenarios: 1) the base scenario with only the 
35 EBA banks and 2) the extended scenario with all EU banks (all member states opt-in). The 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (94/19/EC as amended by 2009/14/EC) provides a A EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND RESOLUTION FUND | 7 
 
harmonised cover of €100,000 throughout the EU. Taking an EU-wide approach, Table 1 
reports the covered deposits under both scenarios. Covered deposits in the EBA banks 
amount to €3,653 billion and in all EU banks to €7,136 billion, using 2010 figures. 
The European Commission (2010b) proposes to build an ex-ante Deposit Insurance Fund of 
1.5% of covered deposits over a period of ten years.5 The fund would be fed by annual risk-
based deposit premiums levied on the participating banks. That would amount to a fund of 
€55 billion for EBA banks and €107 billion for all EU banks (requiring contributions of €5.5 
billion and €10.7 billion per year, respectively, for the first ten years). 
By comparison, the Dodd-Frank Act requires a minimum size of the US Deposit Insurance 
Fund of 1.35% of covered deposits. If there is a shortfall, the FDIC must adopt a restoration 
plan that provides that the Fund will return to 1.35% within 8 years. If the Fund exceeds 
1.5% of deposits, the FDIC must pay dividends to the Fund member banks. 
Finally, the Commission proposes that banks pay ex-post levies of up to 0.5% of covered 
deposits, if necessary. Ex-ante funds will thus cover 75% of the financing of the Deposit 
Insurance Fund and ex-post contributions of 25%. But the collection of this ex-post levy will 
be uncertain in times of crisis. 
To put the numbers in perspective, the EDIRF would amount to €55 billion of private funds 
accumulated from contributions by the EBA banks as a first line of defence for deposit 
insurance and resolution, while the ESM (scheduled to start in July 2012) amounts to €500 
billion of public funds underwritten by the euro area members as a fiscal backstop for 
sovereign countries as well as financial institutions. An interesting question is whether the 
EDIRF could cope with the failure of one or more EBA banks. Dermine (2000) takes the book 
value of equity as a yardstick for the potential costs of a rescue package. 
 Table A.1 in the Annex reports the Tier 1 capital of the 35 EBA banks. Excluding HSBC being 
a global rather than a European bank, capital ranges from about €10 to €70 billion. Once fully 
up and running, the EDIRF could resolve one of the largest EBA banks or two to three mid-
size EBA banks. This shows the benefits of pooling. The current national deposit insurance 
funds are generally not capable of dealing with the failure of one or more of their largest 
banks. 
Table 1. Target size of deposit insurance fund (€ billion) 
   Total EU assets  Covered deposits  Target size of fund 
35 EBA banks  21,576  3,653  55 
All EU banks  42,144  7,136  107 
Note: Total EU assets of the EBA banks are taken from Table A.1 (79% of total assets are within the 
EU). Total EU assets of all EU banks are from EU Banking Structures, ECB, 2010. Covered 
deposits are based on Table A.2 (covered deposits are 41% of total EU deposits; total EU deposits 
are in turn 41% of total EU assets). The target size of the deposit insurance fund is set at 1.5% of 
covered deposits. All figures are rebased to 2010. 
                                                      
5 The proposal for a new Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (European Commission, 2010b) is 
entirely blocked. The European Parliament (EP) and the EU Council have no agreement. The Council 
did not want to go further than 0.5% funding. The EP wants to keep the Commission figure of 1.5%. 
The EP, seeing the Council did not want to move, adopted its report in first reading in February 2012. 
It is the only measure so far of the post-crisis measures not adopted in single reading. 8 |  SCHOENMAKER & GROS 
 
Concluding remarks 
If policy-makers seek to enhance global banking, then the international community must 
provide a higher and better-coordinated level of fiscal support than it has in the past 
(Obstfeld, 2011). The safety net, comprising deposit insurance and resolution, implies a credit 
risk that ultimately must be lodged somewhere. 
The same point applies to the European framework. If policy-makers want to preserve the 
internal market in banking, then the institutional framework must be improved along the 
following lines: 
•  Supervision. Cross-border banks must be placed under the supervision of the European 
Banking Authority. Supervision would then move from a national mandate (with loose 
coordination) to a European mandate. 
•  Lender of last resort. The European Central Bank is already operating as the lender of 
last resort for the European banking system. 
•  Resolution and deposit insurance. A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution 
Authority should be established to stabilise the retail deposit base and resolve troubled 
cross-border banks. The European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund would be 
fed through regular risk-based deposit insurance premiums with a fiscal backstop of 
the European Stability Mechanism. 
However, the European Commission and the EU Council are still seeking solutions at the 
national level, with improved deposit insurance and resolution mechanisms based on the 
home country principle. The financial trilemma (Schoenmaker, 2011) shows that policy-
makers have to choose 2 out of 3 objectives: 1) financial stability, 2) cross-border banking or 
3) national policies. By choosing national policies, either cross-border banking or financial 
stability will suffer. Currently, both are suffering: there is no financial stability in Europe; 
moreover, national supervisors are progressively dismantling cross-border banks by ring-
fencing the local operations. 
A European banking policy is needed to preserve cross-border banking as well as financial 
stability. It is no surprise that the ECB (2012) is supporting this call for a European banking 
policy in its latest Financial Integration Report. 
   A EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND RESOLUTION FUND | 9 
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Annex - Tables 
Table A.1 Ranking of large banks in the EU according to assets (€ billion, 2010 figures) 
   Banking groups  Total assets  Tier 1 capital 
1  BNP Paribas (France)  2,027  70 
2  Deutsche Bank (Germany)  1,934  43 
3 HSBC  (UK)  1,863  101 
4 Barclays  (UK)  1,769  64 
5 Crédit  Agricole  (France)  1,756  59 
6 RBS  (UK)  1,726  71 
7 ING  Bank  (Netherlands)  1,265  40 
8 Banco  Santander  (Spain)  1,235  61 
9  Lloyds Banking Group (UK)  1,178  56 
10  Société Générale (France)  1,149  36 
11  Groupe BPCE (France)  1,064  42 
12 UniCredit  (Italy)  943  44 
13 Commerzbank  (Germany)  765  32 
14  Banca Intesa (Italy)  668  32 
15  Rabobank Group (Netherlands)  662  35 
16  Credit Mutuel (France)  600  28 
17  Nordea Group (Sweden)  589  21 
18 Dexia  (Belgium)  575  19 
19 BBVA  (Spain)  561  33 
20 Danske  Bank  (Denmark)  435  17 
21  Standard Chartered (UK)  392  26 
22 Deutsche  Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank (Germany)  389  9 
23  ABN Amro Group (Netherlands)  385  15 
24 Landesbank  Baden-Württemberg (Germany)  380  14 
25  Banco Financiero y de Ahorros Group (Spain)  333  18 
26  Hypo Real Estate Holding (Germany)  333  7 
27 KBC  Group  (Belgium)  326  17 
28  Bayerische Landesbank (Germany)  321  14 
29  la Caixa (Spain)  290  16 
30  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (Italy)  248  9 
31  Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (Sweden)  247  11 
32 Svenska  Handelsbanken  (Sweden)  244  10 
33  Nord/LB Norddeutsche Landesbank (Germany)  232  8 
34 Deutsche  Postbank  (Germany)  218  5 A EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND RESOLUTION FUND | 11 
 
35  Erste Group (Austria)  209  12 
36 WestLB  (Germany)  194  6 
37 Swedbank  (Sweden)  194  9 
38 Nykredit  (Denmark)  177  8 
39  Bank of Ireland (Ireland)  170  8 
40  Heleba Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen (Germany)  169  6 
41  HSH Nordbank (Germany)  153  6 
42  Allied Irish Banks (Ireland)  147  4 
43 Banco  Popolare  (Italy)  137  7 
44  Landesbank Berlin Holding (Germany)  133  3 
45  Raiffeisen Bank International (Austria)  133  9 
46  UBI Banca (Italy)  132  7 
47  DekaBank Group (Germany)  132  3 
48  Banco Popular Espanol (Spain)  132  9 
49  Banco Base (Spain)  131  5 
50  Caixa Geral de Depositos (Portugal)  128  7 
51  National Bank of Greece (Greece)  122  9 
52  Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten (Netherlands)  120  2 
53 EFG  Group  (Luxembourg)  105  5 
54  Millennium bcp (Portugal)  101  6 
      
  Top 35 (assets of more than EUR 200 billion)  27,311 1,097 
  Top 54 (assets of more than EUR 100 billion)  30,025 1,218 
Source: Top 1000 World Banks, The Banker, July 2011. 
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Table A.2 Total amount of deposits in EU member states (€ billion, 2007 figures) 
Countries  Total deposits  Eligible deposits  Covered deposits 
Austria  286 211 159 
Belgium  418 234 176 
Bulgaria  20 17 12 
Cyprus  66 59 44 
Czech  Republic  82 76 57 
Denmark  206 195 146 
Estonia  9 7 5 
Finland  97 94 71 
France  1,872 1,766 1,324 
Germany  3,245 2,366 1,774 
Greece  231 163 122 
Hungary  60 44 33 
Ireland  367 203 152 
Italy 2,107  574  431 
Latvia 15  12  9 
Lithuania  20 15 11 
Luxembourg 688 104 78 
Malta 33  7  5 
Netherlands  587 446 334 
Poland 139  105  78 
Portugal 184  121  91 
Romania  58 27 20 
Slovakia  35 18 14 
Slovenia  20 15 12 
Spain 1,257  816  612 
Sweden  388 259 195 
United Kingdom  4,311  1,320  990 
     
EU27 16,798  9,272  6,954 
Notes: The original 2007 data were calculated with lower and differing levels of deposit insurance 
cover. The insurance cover is now harmonised at €100,000 across the EU. Based on the 
experience of Italy (which had deposit insurance of about €100,000 in 2007), the covered 
deposits are recalculated. 
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